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 The Federation of Malaysia celebrates its national day on the 31st of every August during which it 
commemorates its independence from British rule.  It is the most widespread holiday in the country and 
it is called as Hari Merdeka (Day of Freedom) or Hari Kebangsaan (National Day) in the Malay language.  
On this day in 1957 the territories in the Malayan Union which were all located in the Malay Peninsula 
formed themselves as the Federation of Malaya.  That federation was first created in 1948.  The 
federation became independent on August 31, 1957.  Later on September 16, 1963, Malaya would be 
joined with Sarawak, North Borneo (now Sabah) and Singapore to form Malaysia.  Two years later 
Singapore would leave the federation of Malaysia to form the independent Republic of Singapore. 
 
 The independence of new states especially those in the Southeast Asian region are given front-
page and editorial attention by Philippine newspapers like the Manila Times and the Manila Daily 
Bulletin.  The independence of former colonies is viewed in the context of the postwar era when 
decolonization was taking place around the world.  Some countries achieved their independence after a 
period of armed struggle such as in the case of Indonesia and Vietnam.  Others gain it through a gradual 
process such as in Malaya and the Philippines.  The Philippines and Malaysia share a common experience 
in gaining their independence from their colonizers.  Both achieved it through a gradual and negotiated 
process and they share the same problems of a communist insurgency and the lingering influence of 
their former colonizers. 
  
 The Philippine interest in the emerging new nation of Malaya has geographical, ethnic and 
historical bases.  Located in the Southeast Asian region, Malaya including the territories still under British 
protection is practically a neighbor of the Philippines.  Majority of the Malay inhabitants are ethnically 
related to the Filipinos who are separated only by means of colonial accident and difference in religion.  
Historically events in the Philippines and Malaya affect each other.  The royal houses in Sulu and 
Mindanao are linked to some of the royal families in Johore and in Singapore.  Some peoples in the 
Philippines like the Samas of Sulu trace their origin from the Malay Peninsula like Johore.  Events in the 
Philippines like the 1896 Philippine Revolution were monitored in the newspapers of the Straits 
Settlements.  Following the execution of Jose Rizal in 1896many Malays named their sons after him.  This 
practice is still being followed today. 
 
 At the time of its independence, Malaya had a population of almost four million people 
encompassing Malay, Chinese and Indian ethnic groups with the majority having Islam as its main 




independence was the one of world’s leading supplier of rubber and the largest producer of tin.  The 
Philippines on the other hand achieved its independence eleven years earlier.  By `1957 it had a 
population of more than 20 million people.  The Philippines was struggling from the problem of post-
World War II reconstruction and like Malaya it was fighting a serious communist insurgency led by the 
Hukbong Magpalaya ng Bayan (HMB).1  Massive military and economic aid from the United States kept 
the rebellion at bay and military operations and government reformed weakened the movement by 
1955.  It was still however a serious threat.  At the time of Malaya’s independence in 1957 the 
Philippines was headed by President Carlos P. Garcia who succeeded President Ramon Magsaysay who 
died in a plane crash on March 17 that year.  CG as the  Philippine press called him, was Magsaysay’s Vice 
President before the latter’s death.  Aside from being Vice President Garcia was the administration’s 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and a staunch advocate of establishing closer relations with the Philippines’ 
neighbors.   
 
The Events Going on at the Time 
 
 As Malaya was preparing for its independence in 1957, the world was in in a grip of an 
ideological war between the United States and the Soviet Union.  Disarmament talks were on going in 
London but were doomed to fail as the Soviets were quick to blame the U.S. for the failure of the talks.  
Western powers insisted on inspection and controls especially on the production of nuclear weapons.  
The Russians hedged on President Eisenhower’s demand on open skies inspection.  The Soviet 
newspaper Pravda said that this would open Soviet territory and the Warsaw Pact countries to the 
aggressive North Atlantic bloc.  It said, “It goes without saying that no peace-loving state can ever agree 
to the flights over its entire territory by the air force of such powers as are overtly preparing for war 
without jeopardizing its own security.2 
 
 The Soviets threatened to walk out of the talks.  The USSR continued its saber rattling as the 
Pravda dropped a hint that the Soviets have a super rocket able to strike any target in the world.  There 
is also a related article that this Soviet missile has an atomic warhead.3  These reports were timed to 
coincide with the London disarmament talks.  To counteract the Soviet propaganda the Americans 
announced that they were on the verge of perfecting a ballistic missile similar to Russia’s.  The arms race 
would escalate further in near future with the launching of the Sputnik satellite in October triggering the 
beginning of the space race between the two superpowers.4 
 
 Another sign of global tension was the expulsion of a U.S. youth delegate named Shelby Tucker 
in China.  Tucker refused to surrender his passport to Chinese customs officials unlike his 41 other 
companions.5  Elsewhere the Soviet Union continued to pour arms into Syria and Egypt increasing its 
influence in the Middle East.  The region experienced its latest war with Israel during the Suez Crisis the 
year before.   
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 In the Philippines the country was preparing for the 50th birth anniversary of the late President 
Ramon Magsaysay.  The Bureau of Post said it would issue a special commemorative stamp to honor the 
former President who was born on August 30, 1957. 6Had he lived during that year Magsaysay would 
have been 50 years old.  On a happier note U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed a bill authorizing 
the payment of $2,600,000 to pay for the pensions of Filipinos soldiers who fought for the United States 
by were captured by the Japanese during the World War II. 7 The U.S. Army ruled that these soldiers who 
were members of the Philippine Scouts were considered discharged when they were paroled by the 
Japanese in June 1942.  The amount authorized by the U.S. government will pay the pensions of the 
former Scouts who served from the time of the Moro Insurrection and the Filipino-American War to the 
Second World War.  The Filipino veterans will be paid at the same rate as U.S. veterans. 8 
 
The Prelude to the Independence Celebrations 
 
 The prelude to Malaya’s freedom day came with the arrival of the guests from various countries.  
Prince Henry William Frederick Albert, the Duke of Gloucester, the third son of King George V and Queen 
Mary arrived in Kuala Lumpur on August 29.  Prince Henry was the representative of Queen Elizabeth.  
Dressed in the white uniform of a lieutenant general, the Duke stepped out of the door of the Britannia 
aircraft and saluted the cheering crowd briefly before stepping down to a waiting line of VIP’s led by High 
Commissioner Sir Donald McGillivray who introduced him to the eight rulers and one regent of the states 
of Malaya.  More than 2,000 people witnessed one of the most impressive ceremonies ever seen in this 
country as the nine Malay rulers and their consorts in colorful dresses and other ranking dignitaries 
greeted the Duke.  Representatives of more than 20 countries who came here for the independence 
celebrations were also at the airport.  The carnival atmosphere began to build up last night 48 yours 
before Malaya becomes an independent state at the midnight of August 30.  A massed band rehearsed 
beneath the sweeping arc lights in front of the Secretariat Building and light-hearted and confident 
crowds smiled from the sidelines as bands played and bagpipes of the Gurkha engineers and the Fifth 
Battalion of the Malaya Regiment and the Malaya police went by.  The sound bounced off the freshly 
polished buildings dressed in bunting facing the grassy Padang and echoed down the fresh glistening 
streets.9 
 
 Meanwhile out in the suburbs of Kuala Lumpur houses and stores looked festive as strings of 
brilliant flags of the new nation and of the eleven states were displayed.  On Friday night the Manila 
Daily Bulletin reported that there will be a big rally at the Padang where the British flag will be slowly 
lowered and the brilliant lights flooding the place will be extinguished for two minutes.  At this point 
torches would be lit.  At the stroke of midnight as a booming bell tolls from the Secretariat Tower, the 
lights will flare again signifying to the Malayans the birth of their independence.10 
 
 The Republic of the Philippines sent a delegation to grace Malaya’s first Independence Day.  It 
was led by two senators, Quintin Paredes who would serve as the ambassador extraordinary of the 
delegation and Senator Domocao Alonto.  Mr. Jose Estrada of the Department of Foreign Affairs who 
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was the Minister Plenipotentiary  accompanied them.  Other members of the Philippine delegation were 
Benjamin Abubakar who represented the Muslim associations in the Philippines.  Two other members 
both representing Filipino Muslim organizations Dato Masiding Alonto and Hadji Ibrahim Aliu have not 
yet arrived at the time.11  The delegation  said that they were happy at the signal (sic) honor of 
representing the Republic of the Philippines and conveying the “sincere wishes of the President of the 
Philippines and the Filipino people for the prosperity of the Malayan nation.”    In their message, the 
delegation said:12 
 
“We are happy to have the signal honor of representing the Republic of the Philippines in the 
celebration of a momentous event in the history of Malaya- an event that will mark the 
emergency (sic) of a new state and the additions of a new member of the family of nations.  We 
have come to convey to the people of Malaya and sincere wishes of the President of the 
Philippines and of the Filipino people for the prosperity and success of the Malayan nation and 
the success of the Malayan government in its future undertakings.  As a close neighbor the 
Philippines looks forward to the furtherance of the friendly relations now happily existing 
between the two countries. 
 
 Visiting dignitaries from other countries also arrived.  These included the United States, France, 
Ceylon and Australia who arrived in Kuala Lumpur on Thursday, April 30.  Other delegations from Japan, 
the Netherlands, Thailand, Vietnam and India arrived earlier.  The American delegation was led by U.S. 
Undersecretary of State Christian Herter who arrived in the capital city after visiting the Philippines.  
With him was Special Ambassador James B. Richards.  Others included Ceylonese Prime Minister 
Solomon Bandaranaike and French Secretary for Foreign Affairs Maurice Faure.   
 
 The welcoming program for the Duke and Duchess of Gloucester was a contrast of the old and 
new traditions.  Gaily robed sultans of the Malay states stepped from modern automobiles as regents 
and aides sheltered them from the sun with golden umbrellas.  The ruler of the state of Negri Sembilan 
who next week officially becomes the next paramount ruler of Malaya or king, wore a gold-crested 
headgear and a uniform and a traditional Malay Sarong with a kris (dagger) inside his blouse.  He drove 
up to the airport in an air conditioned car.  The ruler then walked to the plane’s side to greet the Duke 
who was dressed in the tropical uniform of a field marshal of the British Army.  A 21-gun salute 




 Different and sometimes divergent views were expressed by the guests as they were interviewed 
by newsmen.  Some hoped that the newly-independent Federation of Malaya should join the Manila-
born Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).   
 
 Australian External Affairs Minister Richard G. Casey expressed his private view that Malaya’s 
joining SEATO would be good for both Malaya and Australia.  Moreover he emphasized that he did not 
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want to give the impression that he was trying to press Malaya to do so.  Casey also disclosed that 
Australia is making available to Malaya six diesel railroad engines worth nearly one million dollars.14 
 
 Ceylon’s Prime Minister, S.W. Bandaranaike on the other hand told newsmen that the hoped 
Malaya would not join SEATO.15 
 
 New Zealand’s representative T.L. MacDonald said for his part that he was sure that the British 
Commonwealth will be strengthened with the addition of Malaya into its membership.  He said that New 
Zealand offered to make available to the federation government under the Colombo Plan, a capital grant 
of 250,000 pounds for some suitable project to be agreed upon.  This money seemed likely to be used in 
setting up an agricultural college. 
 
 The Canadian representative declared that the Canadian people welcome Malaya to partnership 
in the Commonwealth.  As a tangible evidence of Canada’s joy on this occasion, we wish to present gifts 
of technical books for the Kuala Lumpur Technical Institute.16 
 
 The American representative, Undersecretary Herter was diplomatic in his comments, saying 
that he was honored to have been chosen by President Eisenhower for his duty in representing the 
United States in the first independence day of Malaya.   
 
Tungku Abdul Rahman’s Views 
 
 At the eve of his country’s independence, Malaya’s Chief Minister Tungku Abdul Rahman who 
would become his country’s Prime Minister after its independence on August 31 gave his final press 
conference on May 28.  He said that his country is not joining SEATO at the present and he rejects the 
setting up of British bases to host nuclear weapons.  He also said that Malaya is fighting a front-line 
battle against international communists and terrorists..  He warned that “if Malaya is defeated in his 
jungle war against the communists, the latter will be knocking at the gates of Europe.”17 
 
 Despite his opposition to communism, Rahman said that he would not commit his country to 
participate in the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization.  He said the decision to join SEATO would be left 
to an independent Malaya at a later date when it becomes more mature and able to make up its own 
mind.  “At this juncture it would be wrong to rush into anything, especially since we feel adequately 
protected under the pending Anglo-Malayan mutual defense treaty,” Rahman added.18 
 
 On the subject of basing nuclear weapons on Malayan soil, Rahman said that there was 
absolutely no provision in the introduction of nuclear weapons here or the use of Malayan bases for such 
weapons.  Earlier British Defense Minister Duncan Sandys indicated in Australia last week that Malaya 
would receive such weapons.  He later retracted his earlier remarks. 
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 Rahman said that if nuclear weapons are needed by SEATO, then it is right that bases for these 
weapons should be in SEATO countries.  He also made it plain that Britain and the Commonwealth 
nations including Australia and New Zealand  will aid Malaya in its nine-year war against the 
communists.19  Earlier he set August 31, 1958 as the deadline for ending the drawn-out war with the 
Reds and said that slightly altered terms will be offered to the terrorists but he declined to discuss them.   
 
 “Unless a target was met,” Rahman explained, “The Malayan people would become complacent 
and regard the war as something that  has gone on and must go on indefinitely.  One thing our people 
must understand:  the communist can never co-exist with anyone with a system different than their 
own.  They drove out the Nationalists from China, they tried to drive out the national regimes in Korea 
and Vietnam.  We would be deceiving ourselves if we thought they would treat us differently.20 
 
 In concluding his discussion on dealing with the communists, the outspoken about to be Prime 
Minister declared, “As my name is Abdul Rahman the communists would kick me out if they took over 
Malaya.”21 
 
 Rahman also discussed the issue on the flow of traffic between Malaya and the island of 
Singapore.  He said that no decision has yet been reached and something would probably have to be 
done later but he pointed out that as people have been used to easy access so long it would be difficult 
to institute new regulations quickly.   
 
 Rahman also dwelt on the issue of racial concerns in an independent Malaya.  The newsmen 
raised the issue of racial restrictions in private clubs in Malaya and they asked if he would intervene on 
this matter.  Rahman said that he had no intention of acting against the private clubs in Malaya which 
have racial restrictions in their rules for membership.  Both European and Asian clubs here and in 
Singapore have such restrictions.  “If they want to have their own clubs that is all right with me,” Rahman 
said, “I have no intention to close down any club although I would like to see more clubs of all races-  
more international in character- operating.”22 
 
Outside, More Festivities and Views 
 
 Meanwhile the Merdeka festivities in Kuala Lumpur reached to a level of frenzy as people were 
going all out in celebrating while waiting for the toll of the midnight bell when the Federation assumes 
statehood.  Most of the foreign dignitaries who arrived here to witness Malaya’s independence 
celebrations were conducted to a tour of the city by a hundred specially-trained protocol officers.  The 
guests toured the city’s historical and picturesque sites in sixty American limousines purchased by the 
Malayan government just for this occasion.23 
 
 Among the delegations which went around the city were the South Vietnamese, the Japanese 
and the Indonesians.  The South Vietnamese delegation led by Education Minister Nguyen Duong Don, 
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noted that he was highly impressed by the enthusiasm which the people of Kuala Lumpur have prepared 
to welcome independence.  He also said that the Vietnamese people were happy to learn that another of 
their neighbors was going to be independent from foreign domination.  He expressed hope that the 
Tengku Abdul Rahman would soon visit the Vietnamese republic.24 
 
 The Indonesian Vice Premier Dr. Hardsono told the press that “Eighty million Indonesians will 
uphold the sovereignty and independence of Malaya. “25 
 The independence celebration officially began when Chief Minister Rahman opened the newly-
built Merdeka (Independence) stadium.  He said that the construction of the stadium which took almost 
a year and at the cost of $800.000 was a “tremendous task undertaken with great determination, 
unequalled in any project which we have undertaken in the past.”26 
 
 The opening ceremony was attended by a holiday crowd of 15,000 people.  School children gave 
a rhythmic gymnastic display and waved blue, red, white and yellow flags- the colors of the new Malayan 
national flag which will be hoisted officially for the first time the next day. 
 
 The stadium which was constructed in the center of the city has a seating capacity of 25,000 and 
contains some outstanding modern features among which were four floodlighting towers, 140 feet high 
which are understood to be of the only type of this kind in the world. 
 
At the Stroke of Midnight  
  
 The main independence event began to unravel before the midnight of August 30.  The Manila 
Times described the occasion in slightly acidic tone in its September 1 issue.  It said that Malaya became 
an independent nation the stroke of midnight Friday, August 30, bringing to and end the much-maligned 
spirit of European colonization on the Asian mainland and that only the small enclaves of GAO (sic)27 and 
Macao and the New Territories adjoining Hong Kong leased by Britain from China still remain under 
foreign flags. 
 
 A crowd estimated to be 30,000 welcomed the occasion in Kuala Lumpur’s parade ground by 
shouting choruses of “Merdeka!” “Merdeka,”  The newspaper explained that “Merdeka” means  
“freedom.”  The unofficial surrender of British authority was signified by the lowering of the Union Jack 
which has flown over Malaya and the Straits for 175 years.28  At two minutes before midnight the lights 
on the spacious parade field went dim.  Then they were rekindled and Malaya was free.   
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 Malaya’s independence however did not become official until the Duke of Gloucester 
representing the Queen of the United Kingdom will present the transfer of power to Chief Minister 
Tungku Abdul Rahman the following day.   
 
 The Times reported that there was no ranking British official present at Friday night’s glittering 
rally which was surrounded by a Hollywood backdrop of illuminated minarets, mosque domes and 
Moorish architecture which make up the Secretariat Building.  If they were there they would have heard 
some rare praises for a colonial power.  That praise came from Tungku Abdul Rahman, the 55-year old 
son of a sultan who became the country’s first Prime Minister.  He noted that Malaya is “blessed with a 
good administration forced (sic)  and tempered to perfection by successive British administrators.  Let 
this legacy left by the British not suffer in (in)efficiency or integrity for years to come.”29 
 
 Rahman hailed independence as “the greatest moment of the life of the Malayan people.  
Humble yourself before God whether in mosques, churches or temples or in our home.  Give thanks to 
Him for this blessing He has showered upon us.”30 
 
 The following morning the Federation of Malaya was officially proclaimed as an independent and 
sovereign state within the British Commonwealth during a solemn ceremony at the Merdeka Stadium.  
The Manila Times reported that the Prime Minister-Designate Tengku Abdul Rahman read the 
proclamation right after receiving from the Duke of Gloucester the instrument of the transfer of 
sovereignty to Malaya.  Rahman read the proclamation right after receiving the transfer of sovereignty.  
The crown watched the transfer document changing hands in pin drop silence. 31 
 
 The pouring rain dampened the occasion as the stadium which had a seating capacity of 25,000 
was half empty.  The rain also delayed the ceremony by one hour and the Duke of Gloucester who was 
supposed to arrive at 8:00 a.m. arrived an hour later.  Rahman read the proclamation first in Malay and 
the crowd applauded and clapped at the end of every sentence.  After the Tungku finished reading the 
proclamation in English, he led the crowd in shouting “Merdeka!” “Merdeka!”32 
 
 At exactly 9:43 the Malayan flag was raised up to a pole by three Malay soldiers to the tune of 
the national anthem “Gara (sic) Ku.”  There was a reading of the Koran and the firing of a 101-gun salute.  
By this time the clouds had lifted and the morning sunshine added color and beauty to the scene.33 
 
 The Times went on to describe the surroundings of the place:  The proclamation was read by the 
Tengku from a large platform erected in the middle of the stadium and covered by a crimson velvet 
carpet.  On this platform Malay rulers clothed in their national (sic) costumes made of various delicate 
shades of batik and embroidered with gold and silver threads, were seated.  The supreme head of state, 
the Yang Dipertuan Agong was wearing across his chest, blue and red indicating his paramount rank of 
precedent.  The Duke of Gloucester, dressed in a general’s white uniform with a white tropical helmet, 
was on his right side.  Facing the proclamation stand was a Malay guard of honor, men dressed in white 
shirts and green sarong.  Behind them was the Malay military police band wearing the same uniform, 














except the sarongs were blue, and further behind were the spectators, many of them also dressed in 
national costumes.  The Tengku led the royal dignitaries back in procession along the red carpet to a 
raised box and then a two-minute prayer was said with the audience standing.  Sitting in the royal box 
with the Duke was Sir Donald Maccillvay (sic) the last British High Commissioner in Malaya.  The Duke of 
Gloucester was at the back of the royal box, along with Prince William and the consort of the Yang 
Dipertuan Agong.  As the ceremony came to an end, huge multicolored balloons were released at the 
center of the Merdeka arena to the noise of firecrackers.   
 
 Chief Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman dedicated his new Asian nation to the cause of mankind 
and world peace on its birthday.  In a speech before he read the declaration of Malayan independence, 
he said:  “We in this country will do in all our power to promote its well-being in the interest of mankind 
in general and in particular the service of world peace.”34 
 
 In reference to the speech of Queen Elizabeth which was earlier read by the Duke of Gloucester, 
Rahman said:35  “You’ve heard the gracious message from Her Majesty the Queen.  Malaya will 
henceforth take her place the great commonwealth of nations whose members are found in all parts of 
the world.”  It is a source of much gratification  to my government that the British servants will continue 
to serve in the country to assist us in the solution of many problems which independence will present.   
 
In conclusion he called upon the Malays to work and be guided by the ideals of justice and 
liberty.  Rahman said 
 
“Henceforth we are masters of our destiny and the welfare of this beloved land is our own 
destiny.  Let now one think we have reached the end of the road.  Independence is only an achievement 
but it only the threshold to endeavor- the creation of a new and sovereign state.   
 
 We call upon all Malays to dedicate themselves to the service of the new Malaya, to work and 
strive to create a new nation inspired by the ideals justice, and liberty inspite of a disturbed and 
distracted world.”  36 
 
Congratulations and More Messages 
 
 Malaya continued to receive messages of congratulations from various countries.  British Prime 
Minister Harold MacMillan sent a message which was handed to the Tungku by Viscount Kilmuir who 




 The Queen’s message read in part: 
“I have entrusted to my uncle the duty of acting as my representative at the celebration of independence of 
your country.  This is a great and memorable day for you.  My thoughts and my good wishes are with you 
as you take up the great and stimulating responsibilities of independence and it is with deep and real 
pleasure that I welcome you to our commonwealth family of nations.   
I am confident that Malaya will respond to the challenging tasks of independence and that she shall 
continue to show the world that example of moderation and goodwill all races has been so marked a 






was one of the official guests at the celebrations.  Addressing the Tungku as Prime Minister, MacMillan 
said:37 
 
“I am very glad to be able to send you by the hand of the Lord Chancellor who is leading the 
United Kingdom delegation this message to welcome the Federation of Malaya on this historic 
occasion of its achievement of independence and of the commonwealth. 
 
Lord Kilmuir brings you the warmest good wishes of the government and the people of the United 
Kingdom for the future happiness and prosperity of your country. 
 
The emergence of Malaya as an independent member of the Commonwealth is the culmination 
of the joint work of our two governments in the past years. 
 
May the 31st of August long be remembered in your history and in ours as a great and happy day 
in the continuing development of Malaya and the commonwealth of nations.” 
 
 
US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles who arrived just in time for the independence 
celebrations stood at a platform with six Malayan flags aground him and in front of him was a big 
Malayan poster with the word “Merdeka.”  He paid a tribute to Malaya’s contribution to freedom before 
independence and said freedom for new nations nowadays is not an easy task but he felt sure that 
Malaya “will win through due to her love of freedom and intention to overcome those elements which 
try to trample freedom.”38 
 
From the Philippines President Carlos P. Garcia wished the Malayan people Godspeed on the 
federation’s independence at midnight tonight after 84 years of British rule.  Garcia expressed his and 
the Filipino people’s most sincere congratulations and best wishes for the happiness and prosperity of 
Malaya in a message carried to Chief Minister Tungku Abdul Rahman by the official Philippine 
representatives. 
 
The Philippine press sent not only its congratulations but also discussed the problems facing the 
new country.  In its editorial the Manila Daily Bulletin wrote:39 
 
“The newly independent Federation of Malaya begins life after some of the same handicaps 
`confronting the Republic of the Philippines eleven years ago.  Since 1948 it has been fighting a 
full-dress war against strong communist forces not unlike the Huk movements but perhaps even 
better organized originally.  The claim is made that the back of the rebellion has been broken, a 
claim that we can fervently hope is true.  Meanwhile Malaya is welcomed into the coterie of 
newly independent nations with the best possible wishes of her neighbors and the blessings of 
the free world. 
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The Manila Times gave a lengthier and down to earth  editorial mentioning other problems such 
as racial stability and problems that come in an economy dependent on a few products such as rubber 
and tin.  Like the Manila Daily Bulletin, it mentioned the communist insurgency which also plagued the 
Philippines.  It also mentioned a reality which faced newly independent countries- the reality of 
neocolonialism.  It wrote:40 
 
“While independence days should be a rule stress optimism and reflect on the general feeling of 
confidence, it would be unwise to ignore the fact that Malaya ventures out under very 
considerable handicaps.  The management of its external affairs will still largely remain in British 
hands while many of its policy will natural be patterned after those of Britain. “ 
 
Commenting on the need to achieve racial harmony, it said “that the resistance from the Left 
may draw renewed power from underlying economic conflicts between non-homogenous minorities.  
The Chinese after all dominate Malaya’s economic life, while the Moslem Malays comprise the biggest 
racial grouping could actually become a minority if the rest of the minorities combine. “ 41 
 
The problem of racial harmony, it said “should not be sneezed as a minor one.  There were other 
problems like the economy being tied up with rubber and tin; conflicting ideological loyalties with 
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could actually become a minority if the rest of the minorities combine.   
The question of racial harmony is not to be sneezed as minor, since in Malaya it is a formidable problem 
that is tied up with rubber and tin, with ideological loyalties with cultural problems and with the 
nationalistic force that naturally receives its greatest impetus from native Malays themselves.   
 
Whatever the outlook, it is reassuring to note that Prime Minister Tuangku Abdul Rahman is an able leader 
and a skillful negotiator who is firmly committed as matter of general principle to collaboration with 
democratic states. 
 
The Philippines naturally watches with a mixture of pride and anxiety as a neighbor, rich in natural 






cultural problems and with the nationalistic force that naturally receives its greatestimpetus from the 
native Malays themselves”42.  
 
The editorial then praised Prime Minister Tungku Abdul Rahman as “an able leader and a skillful 
negotiator who is firmly committed as matter of general principle to collaboration with democratic 
states.”  His being at the helm of Malaya is reassuring as he is firmly committed as a matter of general 
principle to collaboration with democratic states. It concludes:  “The Philippines naturally watches with a 




 Following the proclamation of independence The Manila Daily Bulletin reported Sir Donald 
McGillivray the last British High Commissioner of Malaya flew to Singapore Saturday night, August 31 
leaving Malaya in the hands of two men named Abdul Rahman.  McGillivray was the last symbol of 
British colonialism in the Asian mainland and was believed to be preparing for retirement from 
government service when he returns to London.   
 
 The Malays meanwhile appear to be taking independence in their stride.  The gaily colored 
streets of Kuala Lumpur appear as the only hint that there was anything different from any other 
holiday.  An extension of the celebration was a military parade on Sunday, September `1.  The 
paramount ruler shall grace the big review of Malayan units in Kuala Lumpur.   
 
 The Manila Bulletin then described the two men who were at the helm of Malaya’s government.  
Both Sir Tuangku Abdul Rahman and Prince Abdul Rahman were sworn into their respective offices as 
paramount ruler and prime minister in brief ceremonies in the state throne room.  The Prime Minister 
will serve concurrently as External Affairs Minister. The Tuangku was currently the country’s leading 
political figure however there is a striking contrast between the man who has the power equal to the 
king and prince who will guide the Malayan ship of state.44 
 
 The Bulletin further describes the Tungku: 
 
“Sir Tuangku was a quiet and studious man who is a student of the English language.  He is a 
lawyer by training who gained his degree in England in his twenties.  The Prime Minister is a 
charming member of royalty who came through political ranks after a life of good times in 
England where he made  a half-hearted attempt at being a barrister and was known to have 
been given 28 traffic tickets for speeding in ten years.  He came back to Malaya to take over the 
presidency of the United Malays (sic) National Organization in 1951 and was a steadying 
influence of those who wanted to fight instead of negotiate for self-government.” 
 
Like many leaders in the newly-independent Asian countriesRahman had little patience in 
dealing with economic problems even as Malaya is faced with the need of weaning away from too much 
reliance on rubber and tin.  He appointed an ethnic Chinese Sir Henry Hau Shik Lee a millionaire tin miner 
to continue as finance minister in the first independent government.  










Immediately following the proclamation of independence Prime Minister Tungku Abdul Rahman 
sent a cablegram to United Nations Secretary Dag Hammarskjold requesting the admission of Malaya as 
a member of the UN.  It said:45 
 
“In behalf of my government I have the honor to inform you that the Federation of Malaya 
wishes herewith to make application for membership in the United Nations with all the rights and 
duties attaching hereto.” 
 
Earlier Great Britain and possibly Australia were expected to request a meeting of the Security 
Council to discuss membership in the UN for Malaya.  The Security Council which will meet the following 
week will nominate Malaya’s nomination.  If the Council approves Malaya will be the 82nd member of the 
world body.  Even before the proclamation of  independence Malaya’s chances of admission was 
assured.  It was expected that Malaya’s application would be approved unanimously when the General 




 The achievement of freedom from western colonial rule by the countries neighboring the 
Philippines is viewed with pride by many Filipinos.  For them the coming of independence was the 
realization  of the “first experience of light in the dark night of the vilified Malay race.”  That light first 
came with the Philippine Revolution, according to Apolinario Mabini.  The Philippine Revolution showed 
the light for their social emancipation.46 
 
The Philippines supported aspirations for independence before.  It supported the Indonesian 
freedom movement in the late 1940s and it lent its own Constitution in the 1950s to serve as a model for 
the then government of Republic of Vietnam.  It was always one of the first to recognize the 
governments of its newly-independent neighbors.  The independence of Malaya is seen with special 
interest by Filipinos.  as they are ethnically related.  Though the Philippines gained its independence in 
the aftermath of World War II, it could relate to the Malayan experience as the Philippines was also 
struggling with its communist insurgency.  Another similarity was that the post-independence era also 
ushered in a period of neocolonialism for both countries as aspects of governance is still patterned or 
actually guided by the former colonizers.  Despite the neocolonial arrangement the leader of the newly-
independent country of Malaya, Prime Minister Tungku Abdul Rahman managed to assert his country’s 
prerogatives.  He parried efforts to draft Malaya to join SEATO saying that the matter would need a deep 
study and it would be decided later.  Malaya never joined SEATO or hosted bases that harbored nuclear 
weapons.  He was not a stooge of the former British colonizers and for his strong conviction and Prime 
Minister Tungku Abdul Rahman gained the admiration of many Filipinos.   
 
 Filipinos came to know about the independence of Malaya through the newspapers and the 
radio which are considered as important opinion-makers.  The newspapers give a detailed account of 
historical events which are normally sanitized in history books.  The description of even in the delays in 
the Merdeka ceremonies and the background of the new Prime Minister provided life and color to what 
would be an otherwise black-and-white presentation of history.  The newspapers also depict the context 
                                                          
45
 New State Seeks UN Membership,” Manila Daily Bulletin, September 1, 1957. p. 21. 
46
Apolinario Mabini, The Philippine Revolution, Vol. 1 (Manila: National Historical Institute, 2003), p. 48.   




of history.  The independence of Malaya came at the height of the Cold War and the beginning of the 
Space Race.  As the world was aligning into anti-communist and democratic camps we can see how 
Malaya was choosing its place.  In the days just before the first Hari Merdeka up to a few days after that, 
Philippine newspapers mentioned the events in Malaya.  This is considered one of the proofs of the 
interest of the Filipinos.  It  is quite unfortunate that what was said over radio commentaries about the 
independence of Malaya were not recorded.  Perhaps the best way to record what was said over the 
airwaves can be reconstructed by interviewing those who heard the commentaries on the radio.  One 
aspect that can be recalled by this writer was that the radio commentator Rafael Yabut who had a wide 
appeal was the praises he heaped on personalities like Tungku Abdul Rahman.  Rahman was said to be a 
man of conviction and a strong leader.  Before in December  1949 he was heard talking about Indonesia’s 
pancasila which preached unity in diversity when that country’s  independence was formally 
inaugurated.     
 
 Another reason for the Philippine interest for the independence of Malaya was for Filipino 
scholars to observe if the Malayan Dawn or Malaya Irredenta dreamed of by patriots and writers like 
Jose Rizal and Wenceslao Q. Vinzons,47 will actually take place.  Rizal dreamed of Southeast Asia free 
from colonial bondage while in his time Vinzons envisioned a Malay nation that would consolidate “a 
million brown people.”  This nation is not one state but the entire Southeast Asian region where people 
sharing a common racial and cultural heritage will leave in peace and freedom devoid of colonial 
anthem.  This Malayan union will restore what was destroyed by Western colonialism and 
imperialism.48will remove the old colonial boundaries, create a political union and restore a freedom of 
commerce in the present countries of Southeast Asia that are inhabited by people of Malayan origin.  
Latter leaders like Diosdado Macapagal would try to realize his vision by proposing  the formation of the 
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        J.A.C. Mackie1 
Introduction 
      
On the wee hours of Saturday, the 8th of December 1962, there broke out an armed insurrection in 
Brunei that joltedan otherwise sleepy and the little Sultanate considered a backwater State in Southeast 
Asia. The armed rebels,almost all of them local Malays, easily ransacked the Seria oilfield area and many 
key installations of the Brunei town, while their counterparts simultaneously staged attacks on police 
stations and key installations in the 4th and 5th division of Sarawakincluding Limbang. The surprise attacks 
gained quick initial successes, but as might be expected, the protecting power, Great Britain, invoking 
the British-Brunei Agreement of 1959, moved swiftlyandsuppressed the outbreak within a matter of 
days.2 That single event changed the progressive march of history snuffing out the advantages for a 
popular government fought for by the insurgents and instead achieved the opposite by paving  way for 
an unassailable ascendancy of the Brunei monarchy. 
 
The rebellion remains an enigmatic episode in Brunei history. Having been a sensitive topic of taboo for 
many years, since of late several publications have broached the subject to explain the events, but fall 
short of any credible new revelations. No formal enquiry was held in the aftermath of the rebellion, let 
alone systematic internal investigation into the role of its ring leaders whose actions resulted in the loss 
of lives and damage to property. Neither were any court proceedingson record to formally charge the 
offenders.  Therefore the Brunei rebellion raises many questions tha providing plausible answers. Why, 
for example, did the PRB risk its political advantages soon after the people had voted it to power in the 
August 1962 elections? Did Shaikh A. M. Azahari mean to establish a client state under the aegis of 
Sukarno’s Indonesia? Were the British intelligence services involved in engineering it as some conspiracy 
theorists suggest? What was the Sultan’s stand on this affair? Much documentation exists in the London 
Public Records Office, while some files remain withdrawn from public scrutiny, but they too fuel further 
speculation.3 The Brunei Archives is least helpful. Possibly the Special Branch Files (Brunei and 
Singapore), which are not available for public scrutiny, may contain some valuable clues. Oral interviews 
conducted by the writer with persons involved in the insurrection produced only faint new insight as the 
responses by the interviewees, some of whom spent periods of detention for their alleged role in the 
rebellion, were fairly predictable due to self-censorship as well as post-facto rationalisations. 
 Thus, writing soon after the revolt, a perceptive American observer, Willard A. Hanna, predicted that 
‘the full story of the Brunei insurrection will not soon be told’.4 The waiting is not yet over. 
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 Within three days, i.e., by the noon of 11 December the British had dispatched some 1,600 troops and 
recovered all important installations. All hostages were freed before the end of the month. Of the 2,700 
rebels (estimated by the British as all but a handful of the TNKU) who were captured or had surrendered, 
many were released by mid-May 1963.  
3
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His Majesty Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah himself has shown interest to find out more about the rebellion 
and once requested a briefing from Dato Raja Azam Kamarul Zaman, the Federation State Secretary who 
served in Brunei at the time of the Rebellion. It is not certain if the latter came up with a report.5From 
the spate of writings from the official sources recently and specifically on the topic on the rebellion, it is 
to be presumed that the interest by the government to explain the rebellion has not waned.  It further 
adds to the mystery surrounding the rebellion as explanations are offered based on post-facto 
justifications. More problematic is the revised edition of an M.A. thesis titled ‘Pertumbuhan 
Nasionolisme’6 di Brunei by Dr Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, a former PRB stalwart, who also published a similar 
theme from his Ph.D thesis submitted to University of Malaya. Both texts were published under the aegis 
of the official Brunei History Centre which is keen to continue the monarchic status quo and justify past 
events from the current perspective. The Brunei Foreign Minister, HH Haji Mohamed Bolkiah also wrote 
a book Remember Remember… 8th of December’, the style of which is cryptic, and does not even 
mention the names of the PRB or the rebel leaders. However it is helpful to have some insight into the 
information privy to the special branch files as the writer must have had access to them. Another 
Bruneian author Datu Harun Majid’s Master’s thesis Rebellion in Brunei’ was published in London but it 
repeats the theme, sources and facts from others work on the same topic.  My book on Sultan Omar Ali 
Saifuddin and Britain: The Making and Brunei Darussalam,deals with the Brunei rebellion in detail and I 
was fortunate to receive an official go ahead though it was perhaps the first publication of its kind to 
highlight the career and assessment of Shaikh Azahari, the principal rebel suspect.  
The local writings on the rebellion tend to unduly emphasize the role of Azahari, the main protagonist, 
and his machinations as the primary mover of the rebellion.7  Other historians claim that Azahari is a 
mere scapegoat to divert attention from the manipulations of British intelligence officers.8 Dubbed in 
different ways as a Communist, opportunist, fanatic, and self-seeker and so on largely in conflicting 
British reports, Azahari, now deceased, is made to bear the brunt of the blame. Azahari himself, until his 
death, had maintained that he did not start the rebellion, but had to go along with it once he was 
intimated in Johor on 5 July about it by his brother-cum Brigadier of TNKU, Shaikh Othman Mahmud. 
Circumstantial evidence aside, the truth will never be known as to who was the mastermind behind the 
whole saga. This paper is not about finding out who started the rebellion, but more importantly to 
review the role of Shaikh Azahari and why and how he failed to achieve his avowed goals of 
independence for Brunei within the framework of an independent United Northern Kalimantan State 
under a constitutional monarchy led by the Brunei Sultan. It would also be useful toassess his role vis-à-
vis the Cold War politics in Southeast Asia. 
Variously described as a rebellion, revolt, uprising, and insurrection, in retrospect it was a hopelessly 
botched attempt by wistful revolutionaries. The insurrection had been both won and lost within its first 
twelve hours. Commenting retrospectively on its outcome, an American political analyst was perhaps 
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justified in dubbing the affair as a ‘Teapot Rebellion’.9It was never destined to succeed, and like the 
business undertakings of its chief protagonist, Azahari, it fizzled out almost as soon as it started. 
Azahari’s belief that there would be simultaneous anti-Malaysia insurrections in Sarawak, North Borneo, 
and Singapore was based on illusory expectations of support from the Chinese-dominated Sarawak 
United People’s Party, and perhaps from the large transient Indonesian population in the Tawau district 
of North Borneo.  In fact, the rebellion was staged almost entirely by Brunei Malays and their kith and kin 
in the adjacent districts in Sarawak and North Borneo. Yet, some believe that the rebellion came close to 
success. For example, Lord Selkirk in a despatch to the Whitehall wrote that ‘the rebels thought... [the 
revolt] was a pushover and it very nearly was’.10 Brigadier Smith, a military expert, affirmed that the 
rebels’ plan was ‘well considered’; and had it really been put into effect ‘before British forces were able 
to arrive in strength from Singapore, then the story of Brunei and the Confrontation that followed would 
have been very different’.11A full treatment of the 1962 revolt lies beyond the scope of this paper.12 But 
the importance of the revolt cannot be over-emphasised as a harbinger of the future course of Brunei’s 
political history. Also, the rebellion is crucial to understanding the forces at work that froze the 
democratic process set in motion during the early years of the reign of HH Sultan Haji Omar Ali Saifuddin 
(r.1950-1967). 
Several hypotheses have been put forward as possible causes for the revolt.  For example, A. C. 
Brackman gave a list of issues that generated discontent in many strata of Brunei society at the time: 
abuse of religious power, hostility towards Europeans and Chinese, exploitation by the oil industry, 
nationalism, and awareness of Britain’s diminishing influence.13 G. P. Means does not believe that the 
revolt was anti-British, anti-Sultan, or anti-Court, but was ‘against anyone opposing Brunei’s recovery of 
Sarawak and North Borneo’ while also commenting, however, that the rebels ‘were never very clear 
about their objectives’.14 J. A. C. Mackie cited several factors, including opposition to the Malaysia 
Federation, which the rebels saw as a plot to maintain a conservative regime and British neo-colonialism. 
The rebels also feared the loss of Brunei’s oil wealth to Kuala Lumpur, as well as being taken over by the 
better educated peninsular Malays. They also dreamed of re-establishing Brunei’s bygone empire. 
Mackie states that, ‘all these attitudes--particularly the first--probably played a part; however misguided 
they might have seemed to outsiders’.15 Mackie and others think that it was conceivable for Azahari to 
expect the Sultan’s support for a rebellion, because ‘they were united in opposition to the Malaysian 
idea’.  
                                                          
9 Gayl. D. Ness, ‘Brunei’s Teapot Rebellion’, Despatch to Mr. Richard H. Nolte, in Institute of Current World 
Affairs, CDN-21, New York, 22 December, 1962. For similar descriptions of the rebellion as a pathetic 
‘minuscule affair’, Phillip Darby, British Defence Policy: East of Suez, 1947-1968, OUP, London, 1973, p. 
232, and ‘a storm in an oil barrel’, in Nihal Singh, Malaysia: A Commentary, Associated Publishing House, 
New Delhi, 1971, p. 96.  
10
 CO 1030/1074, The UK Commissioner General in S.E. Asia to F.O., Telegram No. 369, 18 December 1962, 
para 6. 
11
 Brigadier E. D. Smith, Counter Insurgency Operations: 1. Malaya and Borneo, Ian Allan, London, 1985, p. 
48. 
12
 For a PRB point of view, see Zaini Haji Ahmad, Pertumbuhan Nasionalisme. 
13
 A.C. Brackman, Southeast Asia’s Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago,London: Pall 
Mall, 1966. 
14
 G. P. Means, Malaysian Politics, Hodder and Stouton, London, 1976 (2nd Ed.) p 308. 
15




If viewed from the Brunei perspective, the issues involved were far more complex than those suggested 
by outsider observation. The two studies by G. J. Poulgrain and Unnikrishnan Menon gave considerable 
attention to the Brunei revolt characterising it as a struggle between an emerging democratic idealism 
and the Sultan’s traditional right to absolute power.16 Sympathetic to the point of view of the rebel 
leaders themselves,17 their findings scarcely attempt to investigate the role played by Brunei’s monarchy 
in ensuring a stable transition from British protectorate status to monarchic rule.Zaini Haji Ahmad’s 
book, the first edition of Pertumbuhan Nasionalisme attempts to offer somewhat a readable account, 
but his own point of view is overly influenced by his role as an insider in the PRB. On the other hand, 
Pehin Jamil’s, (the Head of the Brunei’s official History Centre,) account of the rebellion in his Liku-
LikuPerjuangan lays the entire blame on those who sought to limit the power of the Brunei monarch and 
his ruling elite.18 His subsequent work on 8 Disember:Dalangnaya Siapa (i.e., Who was the mastermind?) 
is a further attempt to discredit Azahari and to label him as a Communist lackey. Comparatively speaking, 
Prince Mohamed Bolkiah’s book Remember, Remember: The 8th of December does not refer to the 
theme of Communism as the primary force. Harun Majid’s thesis Rebellion in Brunei also does not refer 
to the theme Communism as the explanation for the events. Both my work Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin 
and Britain: The Making of Brunei Darussalam, and Professor Anthony. J. Stockwell’s valuable article on 
the ‘Royal Ascendancy in Brunei’ placed the rebellion in the context of the colonial policy and the desire 
of the late Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin to reinforce his dynastic rule unhindered and unchallenged. The 
present paper specifically aims to review Azahari’s policies and role in the Rebellion in order to 
understand the strength and weakness of the rebellion that was destined to fail. 
The Early Career  
Azahari bin Shaikh Mahmud (A.M. Azahari) was born on 28 August 1928 in Labuan.19 His father was of 
Arab descent (hence the title Shaikh) , but his mother was a Brunei Malay.20 Educated in English at the 
Brunei Town Catholic mission school (later St. George’s School), he was one of the talented Brunei young 
men chosen to be trained abroad by the Japanese, who despatched him to Bogor in Java to study 
Veterinary Science. He was then only fifteen years of age and it is said that he had left against his 
parents’ wishes.21 He did not complete his formal training in Java, but in 1947 he joined the Sekolah 
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Ekonomik in Java, where he studied commercial subjects for two years.22Perhaps it is in Java that he had 
met Dr. Mohammad Hatta, and got involved in the Indonesian independence struggle against the Dutch 
colonialists. In Bogor he developed a comradeship with Achmad Zaidi of Sarawak in a quest for 
independence for the British controlled North Borneo territories.23 
Azahari joined the war against the Dutch after Sukarno and Hatta made their unilateral declaration of 
Indonesian independence on 17 August 194524 and took part in the battles of Palembang and Surabaya.25 
In mid- 1945 he joined the Badan Keamanan Ra’ayat, the precursor to the Indonesian army under 
General Sudirman.26 From 1946 to 1950 Azahari remained in Purwakarta, Southeast of Jakarta, 
contributing to the Indonesian struggle by setting up an intelligence network to monitor Dutch activities. 
When Indonesia won independence in 1949, Azahari’s attention turned to happenings in Brunei. He 
declined several offers to serve in Purwakarta, including an offer to be a Chief Police Officer in Jakarta.  
Brimming with ideas learnt from the liberation struggle of Indonesia, he returned to Brunei sometime in 
October 1952.27 News of his impending return to Brunei alarmed the British authorities28because of his 
background as a nationalist fighter in the Indonesian struggle for independence.29The British Resident E. 
E. F. Pretty tried to prevent Azahari’s return in early 1951, but the Sultan seemingly welcomed him as a 
resourceful person to serve the State.30The educated and smart Azahari soon became a favourite of the 
Sultan, and besides, his silver-tongued oratorical skills plus his Arab ancestryearned himesteem among 
the ordinary Bruneians.His charisma did precede his return as the young men of Brunei at the time 
virtually revered someone like Azahari who actually had taken part in a freedom struggle, and chose to 
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live among them and relate his exploits during the Indonesian revolution.31 But soon the Sultan became 
suspicions of Azahari’s motives- being prompted and influenced by the of British [oil] interests—. And 
very soon he earned the Britishofficialdom’s wrath.32Importantly, the British Malayan Petroleum 
Company (BMPC) considered Azahari’s presence in Brunei a threat to its economic interests and 
portrayed him as a sort of ‘Communist’ trouble maker and a promoter of Indonesian interests.33 
Azahari had mastered the blueprint for a text-book style plan of action in application of anti-colonial 
struggle which he had learnt from the Indonesian revolution. First, he looked for a ‘cause’ for mass 
mobilisation against the colonial interests. Second, he formed underground cells to train the activists. 
Third, he guided his close associates to infiltrate the local security establishment, i.e., the police. Fourth, 
he introduced rudimentary trade union action, chiefly to disrupt the workings of the BMPC, the most 
important artery in the economic life of Brunei. Fifth, when the slightest repression occurred he roused 
the masses to come out openly in public to demonstrate against the alleged injustice of the British 
administration. Finally, if peaceful means failed to materialise the transfer of power he had a blueprint of 
the Indonesian model for direct armed struggle to grab power. However, in his struggle to attain Brunei’s 
independence, it was hard for Azahari to uncouple his professed loyalty to the Brunei Sultan with anti-
colonial sentiments. In other words, he could not raise a banner against the Sultan as well as the colonial 
power at the same time. Anyone in his position had to realise the importance of the Brunei monarchy as 
the symbol of supremeMalay unity. Besides, the Sultan was not only the sovereign, but in principle he 
was the source of all authority for the British administration as well.Thus, (Sir) Anthony Abell, the British 
High Commissioner, reported to the Colonial Office in 1953 that ‘I do not think that Azahari will at the 
present time find any great following for his avowed aim of turning the Sultan off his throne and making 
Brunei a republic.’34The BMPC workforce became the testing ground for Azahari’s early radical political 
activism. According to BMPC reports implicating direct Indonesian support35 for political activities of 
Azahari in early 1953 ‘the threat itself was ominous enough, as it envisaged mobbing the police stations, 
taking over arms stored there, and subsequently rounding up the entire European community!’36 
The Government did not spare strong arm tactics to contain protests at the earliest manifestation. Thus 
over the BRUFICO affair and the fiasco that followed in which the Resident’s office was besieged by 200 
of his mob followers,37Azahari and seven protestors received jail sentences, for unlawful assembly and 
disturbing the peace in the State. Seven protestors received one year sentence while that of Azahari was 
halved to six months. While still in jail Azahari’s mass appeal grew stronger and an incipient underground 
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movement, Gerakan bawah di tanah, had begun take shape. According to intelligence reports ‘[W]hile 
Azahari was in prison, an attempt was made to organise a revolt, which was to take over the police 
stations, release Azahari, and start a provisional Government under his leadership’.38Again for offences 
under unlawful assembly three of his associates were jailed for one to two years. They were Mohammad 
Haji Manggol,39(who had already spent a three month prison term for his involvement in the January 
23rd unlawful assembly case in Brunei town), (brother of Mohd. Haji Manggol) and Jais Karim40 received 
one year sentences.41Following his release from prison in late 1953 until 1956, Azahari concentrated on 
business activities travelling often between Singapore and Malaya.42 
The Birth of the PRB 
The massive 1955electoral victory of the Alliance party under Tunku Abdul Rahman and the rising 
demand for Merdeka’ (Independence)inspired Azahari’s political ambitions. He attended the UMNO 
assembly in Kuala Lumpur at that end of that year and was pleased to hear Tunku’s plea for a united 
voice of not only Malaya but his Borneo neighbours43 of Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo.Interviewed 
by Utusan Melayu, Azahari agreed that the Federation must sponsor a united front to demand 
independence and the incorporation of Northern Borneo in the Federation of Malaya.44 On the other 
hand, the Tunku’s pro-British rightist politics did not seem to interest  Azahari who aligned himself more 
with the left leaning Partai Rakyat Malaysia (PRM), headed by Dr Burhanuddin Hilmy and Ahmed 
Boestamam who were strongly anti-British and promoted an expanded Indonesia- Malay 
homeland.45Azahari’s early attempt to form a branch of the PRM in Brunei in January 1955 did not get 
the Government approval as also there was disagreement among the local sponsors of the party.46 
                                                          
38
 CO 1030/1075, D. C. White’s report on ‘A. M. Azahari’, 27 September 1961, Annexed in Brunei: Note by 
the Colonial Office, Colonial Office, 28 December 1962. According to a contemporary newspaper report 
the three accused were allegedly members of a secret society that advocated overthrow of the Brunei 
administration. Straits Times, 7 & 8 October 1953. 
39
 Mohd. Manggol bin Dato Seri Paduka Tuan Haji Manggol, born c.1930, was sent to Labuan on a 
Government scholarship to study in the Government English School. He once acted as a local guide to the 
BMA officials. Became a pupil teacher in 1947 and received training in SITC, Perak, Malaya from 1948 to 
50, where he became an ardent follower of radical Malay nationalist Ahmad Boestamam and Harun 
Aminur Rashid. Returning to Brunei, he became an early convert to Azahari’s teachings. He knew Azahari 
from his Labuan days. Mohd. Manggol went on to pursue tertiary education at Madras University from 
1956-61 and remained only as an external spokesman for the cause of the PRB. In 1961 he left to 
Indonesia to further his studies. While still a student at Gajah Mada Universiti in Yogyakarta, he became a 
promoter of the Negara Kesatuan Kalimantan Utara (the Northern Kalimantan State) concept. He was the 
foreign Minister in Azahari’s Government in Exile after the failure of the rebellion and their relations have 
been strained since then. Has lived in Indonesia ever since, but recently returned to Brunei to develop his 
business interests. Personal Interview held at Pusat Sejarah, Brunei, 18 April 1994.  
40
 A policeman who became an active follower of Azahari and a leading PRB figure, he was arrested for his 
role during the rebellion and detained for more than a decade.  
41
 BA/0257/83, (SUK Series 3, Box 20), Item 94, Petition of Dato Seri Paduka Tuan Haji Manggol, Penghulu, 
Kampong Kilanas to H. H. the Sultan of Brunei, 8 October 1953. 
42
 Personal Interview with Azahari, 7 April 1994. Azahari and his brothers, especially Sheikh Nikman, owned 
a business company known as the S. M. & Sons which dealt in quarrying, contract works, and transport.  
43 For details see Mohamed Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Federation: Political Unification in 
the Malayan Region 1945-65, Penerbit Universiti Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 1974, pp. 129-131. 
44 Utusan Melayu, 31 December 1955. 
45
 For an account extreme political movements in Malaya see Firdaus Haji Abdullah, Radical Malay Politics: 





The UMNO could not be the role model for a left leaning Azahari whose constituency lay among a 
working class population with little or no literacy. His supporters largely from the ranks of the oil-
workers, fishermen, rural agriculturists, the daily wage-labourers and the like were easily attracted to his 
anti-colonial rhetoric.47Except Azahari who had some English education, most of the leaders of the PRB 
were less educated and less sophisticated.48The Brunei Annual Report of 1956 superciliously described 
the PRB as having a very limited following among the ‘educated classes’, being drawn largely from the 
working class and dismissed ex-Government servants who saw in the party a means of expressing their 
discontent.When compared, UMNO’s leadership was essentially an ultra-right to conservative, English-
educated, aristocratic to upper-middle class, propertied group, that did not sponsor radical social 
change.49Tunku Abdul Rahman, its leader, himself a scion of Kedah royal family. Reminiscing in 
retrospect, his former colleague Zaini Ahmad has remarked that had Azahari decided to form a branch of 
UMNO in Brunei that would have received patronage from the colonial administration and enabled 
Azahari to rise to the helm even bringing early independence in the trail of Malaya’s success.50 
Since 1955, Azahari cultivated friendship with Che’gu Harun Mohammed Amin, alias Harun Rashid, a long 
term resident in Brunei.51 It was Che’gu Harun who in 1955 first introduced Azahari to the left-of-centre 
Malayan leaders, Dr. Burhanuddin Helmy52 and Ahmed Boestamam.53 On 11 November 1955 Azahari had 
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attended the launching in Perak of the Parti Rakyat Malaya (PRM), under the leadership of Ahmed 
Boestamam. The PRM appealed to all the Malays of the archipelago to unite to dispel colonialist 
influence and to set up a `Malay Homeland’.54Their creed appealed to Azahari more than UMNO did as 
he envisioned Brunei towards independence away from neo-capitalism. Not surprising, therefore, that 
he not only adopted Socialist-Nationalist-Democracy as his motto, but also tried to name his party as 
‘Nationalist Socialist Party’.55 
In the end Azahari formed the Partai Rakyat Brunei (the PRB or Brunei People’s Party), the first of its kind 
in the British held Northern Borneo, on 15 August 1956 with some 10,000 members already on roll. The 
party manifesto opposed ‘all forms of colonialism in the political, economic and social spheres’ and 
requested independence for Brunei through Constitutional means. In the new system they willed to 
safeguardand continue the position of the Sultan as a Constitutional monarch. It would also strive for a 
Malay nation comprising all states in the Malay Archipelago. In the economic sphere it would fight for 
the worker’s welfare and equal distribution of the state’s wealth.56At the outset Azahari and his 
associates had held discussions with the High Commissioner Anthony Abell, the British Resident J. O. 
Gilbert, and also the UK Commissioner General in South-East Asia, Malcolm MacDonald.57 As advocates 
of democratic traditions, they must have found the PRB a healthy development that deserved their 
blessings. Azahari, despite his confrontational attitude with the officialdom, was accepted as the best 
choice as a party leader, although now and then the British dispatches did irritatingly condemn Azahari 
as self-seeker and an opportunist and so on. Although an anti-colonialist, Azahari approached his British 
masters with understandable deference. In his first speech to the PRB gathering, for example, Azahari 
emphasised that ‘[W]e do not hate the British at all. On the contrary we respect and love them as our 
“guru” [teachers], particularly if the English Government recognise our rights’.58Unlike the Malaya 
Federation, Brunei had more in common with the politically backward adjacent territories of Sarawak 
and North Borneo.  
 
      II 
The events that unfolded since the founding of Brunei’s first political party can be viewed from two 
dimensions. The first is related to the domestic politics, and the other impinged upon the cold war 
politics in Southeast Asia. Domestically the PRB’s rise leant legitimacy to the British efforts to build up 
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instruments of representative governance. In May 1953 the Sultan did announce his intention to launch 
the first written Constitution for Brunei. The whole process of drafting an agreeable Constitution took an 
inordinate duration of six years to be put into effect.59 The Constitution–making in Brunei turned out be 
an arduous undertaking that turned out to be a contest between the reigning monarch, and the colonial 
government while the PRB could only play the role of an onlooker, despite desperate efforts to make its 
voice heard. In contrast, in the Federation of Malaya the Sultans, and the elected political leaders sat 
together to reach common understanding under the aegis of the British. In Brunei however the Sultan 
was not willing to dilute his power and systematically outsmarted the colonial schemes from turning him 
into a Constitutional monarch and an aspiration of the PRB too.Brunei represented an unprecedented 
phenomenon in the British history of decolonisation.60 It might have been easier for the issues to resolve 
had Brunei asked in one voice for self-government. But there was a three corner tussles for power 
involving the Sultan, the British administration and the PRB. According to its British promoters the 
Constitution should be the stepping stone towards systematically introducing instruments of governance 
before they cease their responsibility as the protecting power. As for the Sultan, his primary objective 
was to transfer power into his hands for self-administration albeit ensconced safely under the security 
umbrella of the British. The PRB clamoured for a greater share of power under the proposed 
Constitution in the new legislative and executive Councils meant to replace the obsolete State Council 
system functioning since 1907.  
 
From the very beginning the PRB was wrong footed in representative politics. In 1956 the party was 
offered a chance to take part in the nominated Local Councils in accordance with an Enactment passed in 
that year. But they refused to take part in the local councils. 61In Singapore and Malaya, the local council 
elections held in 1952-53 had helped to advance the careers of many a budding politician.62In Sarawak 
too similar local Councils operated quite successfully since 1952. In Brunei the locals were to be 
nominated by the Sultan in the four District Councils and a separate Town Council for Brunei Town. 
There were reasons why the PRB refused to take part in Local Council affairs. First, it opposed the 
nomination principles characterised as ‘another symptom of colonialism’ because the nominated could 
not speak freely.63 Second, Bruneians loathed paying taxes and dues which Sarawak had imposed on its 
people following the introduction of the local councils. The traditional Government officials such as- 
village headmen and penghulus--felt that the powers of the Councils would circumscribe their 
prerogatives and duties.The opposition to the introduction of local Government developed to such an 
extent ‘that there was no alternative but to defer the application of this local Government 
legislation’.64The failure of the democratic experiment at this stage had far-reaching effects. If the PRB 
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was at fault, then the verdict of history would be that it had undermined a worthy opportunity to 
advance Brunei politically. An impatient PRB was to pay a greater price in the future when it tried again 
to ‘leap too many fences at once’. 
During the period between 1957-1959, when the Constitutional negotiations were taking place between 
the Sultan and the Colonial Office, the PRB’s fortune was increasingly ebbing low. The Sultan dragged his 
feet until all his prerogatives as the country’s supreme ruler could be retained in the new Constitution. 
His main strategy was to transfer power into his own hands from the Resident’s control while the 
administration will be passed on to a Menteri Besar as practiced under the traditional constitutions of 
the un- Federated Malay States, particularly Johor. He also wanted his own nominees and officials to be 
in a majority in the proposed Legislative and Executive Councils. Nor did he agree to the election process 
by secret ballot and majority rule.  His adamant and supposedly rightful attitude ran counter to both the 
British expectations to install Westminster type system as in other dependent territories and the 
democratically minded Azahari and his party.  Therefore it was not surprising that the final Constitution 
took an inordinate period of six years in the making while frustrating the ambitions and activities of the 
democratically inclined PRB.  
 
Since 1957 Azahari and his party experienced a successive string of failures. On a couple of occasions he 
even resigned from his chairmanship of the party, only to be re-elected by popular request. As for the 
British, Azahari’s leadership and the PRB became a sine qua non if the political reforms in Brunei were to 
become a reality under an elected representative system of government. On various occasions, Azahari 
and stalwarts in the party were met by the British administrators including the Resident J.O Gilbert, Sir 
Anthony Abell, the Governor cum High Commissioner, and Rt. Hon’ble Malcolm MacDonald, the 
Commissioner General for South East Asia during the formative years of the party and thereafter. 
Obviously the British did not wish to see the PRB’s eclipse. In 1957 a desperate Azahari even warned that 
they might provoke the people of Brunei to revolt.65 Whenever Azahari became depressed and 
threatened to quit politics, both Gilbert and Abell seemed to have been concerned. To them Azahari was 
the only reasonable politician with whom the British could deal, and they discouraged him from quitting. 
‘I am afraid...there are even less reliable people waiting to step into his shoes. However, he is I think the 
only person who can hold the party together’, wrote Abell in a confidential dispatch to the Colonial 
Office’.66 But the British administration could not be seen to lend support for Azahari’s cause for fear of 
alienating the Sultan’s goodwill.  
 
In May 1957 the PRB engaged a British Lawyer Walter Raeburn to present their case on a well-argued 
‘Merdeka’ memorandum to the Colonial Office to enshrine representative rights on electoral principles 
which too did not make any headway. During the London negotiations between the Sultan and the 
British Government in September 1957, Azahari virtually had to gatecrashinto the Colonial Office, 
uninvited, and with a mission impossible for popular participation in the government that never yielded 
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any results.67 As a principal facilitator of the Constitutional talks, the High Commissioner Anthony Abell 
had to walk a tight rope and strike a balance between the Sultan’s proposals and some persistent 
demands of the PRB -- the franchise and full elections on the other hand. But Abell rejected the PRB’s 
extreme proposals--such as a ministerial form of Government--that would allowthe untested PRB 
leadership to take power directly not only from the Sultan but from the British too.After his failed 
mission Azahari was said to have been completely deflated and was even talking of giving up politics and 
concentrating on his various businesses,68 which also did not seem to have prospered.The Sultan 
distanced himself from the PRB, and reminded the agitators that Bruneians should not ‘be too optimistic, 
proud or boastful to think that we are strong enough to stand on our own’.6970 Targeting the PRB's 
propaganda, he proved that he was no puppet of the British Government and emphasised that none 
could ask for the independence of Brunei, because ‘Brunei is not a British Colony’.71 
 
The Brunei Constitution was finally promulgated on 29 September 1959. The PRB’s voice was muted 
in the end while the final document fell far short of the party’s expectations. Whereas the British hoped, 
and as A. J. Stockwell commented ‘that a written constitution would act as a check on an absolute 
monarch and his courtiers who by 1958 ignored and even ridiculed the British resident, his highness used 
the device, in much the same way as had Sultan Abu Bakar of Johore in 1895, in order to reassert 
monarchical authority against British interference’.72 In the end the final Constitution made provision for 
the hierarchy of Government, with His Highness the Sultan and Yang di-Pertuan as the supreme 
executive authority of the land, followed by a Privy Council (Majlis MesyuaratDi-Raja), Executive Council 
(Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan became the  Council of Ministers, Majlis Mesyuarat Menteri-Menteri), and a 
Legislative Council (Majlis Mesyuarat Negeri). 
The Legislative Council, the principal law-making body in the country, was to consist of eight ex-officio 
members--the two Wazirs, the Mentri Besar, State Secretary, Attorney General, State Financial Officer, 
the Religious Adviser, and another official to be designated by the Sultan. In addition there would be six 
officials, three unofficial members to be nominated by the Sultan, and sixteen elected members chosen 
from the District Councillors. Elections to District Councils were to be held not later than two years after 
the date of the promulgation of the new Constitution. Pending the elections, in the interim period, the 
Sultan would appoint all the members for a period of two years.73 The Sultan might address the 
Legislative Council at any time upon any matter he saw necessary. He could by proclamation (published 
in the gazette) prorogue or dissolve the Legislative Council or any Committee thereof. Each new 
Legislative Council has a maximum life span of five years from the date of first meeting. It might be 
dissolved sooner if the need arose. The constitution was a blow to the PRB’s aspirations. Denouncing it 
as an instrument of colonialism, the party said that the constitution gave Brunei not self-government but 
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self-administration.74 In the PRB’s view, the proposed Brunei constitution would not benefit the common 
people, but only the British and a privileged few Bruneians. Yet, the now impotent PRB could do nothing 
but protest through press releases.  
Nonetheless In the interim LegCO, the Sultan nominated Azahari as member which he accepted out 
of deference his Sultan. The Sultan appointed a Brunei-Malaysia Commission in early January 1962 to 
report on the opinion of the people, (the equivalent of the Cobbold Commission sent to Sarawak and 
North Borneo for the same purpose.) The Brunei LegCo became a forum for debate on the Malaysia 
issue, although the Mentri Besar kept reminding the members that the question of Malaysia could not 
be decided in the LegCo, as it was the Sultan’s prerogative to accept or reject the Malaysia proposal. 
Although most members were silent on the issue, few individuals, were loudly critical of the 
Government’s attitude. Immediately after being sworn in on April 16, Azahari introduced a resolution on 
his Kalimantan Utara proposal, which was soundly defeated whereupon he described the Council as 
undemocratic and ‘the kind of colonial legacy that turns people into communists, even though they are 
not communists at heart’.75 With that came Azahari’s exit forever from ‘representative’ politics. After 
resigning, a dejected Azahari lamented that ‘I am downhearted and despondent that my work as a 
nationalist...appears to be of no avail under the present system...in Brunei’.76 
      III 
 
Although the PRB was seemingly lying low after the promulgation of the Constitution, the party was 
getting increasingly radicalised due to frustration felt at the rank and file of the party. It consisted of 
leaders with various backgrounds nurtured by rabid anti-colonial feelings. The chief among them was  
H. M. Salleh, a Malay educated school teacher who went to prison on charges of collaboration with the 
Japanese when the British returned to reestablish their government over Brunei at the end of the Pacific 
War.  He was the most radical of all and loathed by the British adminsitration, but Azahari, considered a 
moderate, got the better of him in political leadership. In 1958, when Azahari’s delegation returned 
empty handed from their trip to meet Colonial Office mandarins, Salleh raised the banner of revolt 
during the Party Congress held in 1958. The party consisted of differing shades of opinion and levels of 
activism including those who would resort to the  bullet if the ballot box failed. H. B. Hidup, a party vice-
president was a key trade union activist of the early 1950s and there were Manggol brothers who went 
to prison for sedition by forming underground cells. Then there was Yassin bin Affendi, another radical 
minded Secretary General of the party who went to Labuan in the early days and received some military 
training. Among the other moderates were Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, whose father was an important State 
functionary and a supporter of the Sultan, and educated in the UK and the other was Hapidz Laxamana, a 
scion of a landed proprietary family who easily rallied the workers under Brunei United Workers Front, 
popularly known as 4Bs (acronym for Barisan Buroh Bersatu Brunei in Malay) which consisted of four 
different bodies and had been officially registered on 27 October 1960.77As for Azahari, the party needs 
to be kept intact by yielding to different aspirations of his followers. Their members were also supporters 
of the PRB. It pledged to stand by all agitation made by the PRB which it predicted would return to 
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power after elections.78 The situation was indeed getting out of control as the PRB stepped up verbal 
attacks on the Government. ‘There is no administration in the world so weak. We urge the Government 
to improve things...the first time we will be patient, the second time we give warning, and the third time 
we give a slap’ threatened Azahari.79As a former stalwart of the PRB himself explained, the party 
advocated an approach of “Anarchy, chaos and new order”. ‘It involved the creation of a “power 
vacuum” by violence and once created, a revolutionary group would take over the machinery of the 
Government in the midst of a confused society’, wrote Zaini Haji Ahmad.80 Thus the PRB launched an 
underground campaign to form an army that came to be known as, Tentera Nasional Kalimantan Utara 
(TNKU) or the National Army of North Kalimantan formed in mid-1961. Evidence is inconclusive about its 
origins, formation and modus operandi. As its name suggests, the army was to be built upon the 
nationalist urgings of all those who favoured a North Kalimantan State. Ideally its members were to be 
drawn from all three territories. Since May 1962, Azahari who had left Brunei might have been devoting 
much attention to the building up of the TNKU.81 
 
The Brunei Elections and the Rejection of Malaysia proposals  
 
It is relevant to mention here that besides political demands, there were equally other contentious 
issues of national importance that impeded the Constitution-making i.e., The envisaged formation of a 
Federation between the three Northern Borneo territories of Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei. 
Strange bedfellows as they were, both the British and Azahari saw eye to eye on the issue of forming a 
United North Borneo-Federation. The British believed that such a Federation would protect British 
Borneo from a ‘potentially acquisitive Indonesia’ and will level social and economic developments in the 
territories concerned and more importantly as a prelude to the formation of a future Federation Malaya 
and Singapore.82The move was a prelude before a final Federation was to be formed including Malaya 
and Singapore. Urged by the common bonds and nationalist sentiments that bound the three States, 
Azahari’s party manifesto envisaged the setting up of a United Kalimantan State under the Brunei’s 
monarch’s leadership. The Brunei Sultan Haji Omar Ali Saifuddin, however, shunned away the proposals 
because he did not want his State to lose its identity in the first place, and second he resented Brunei’s 
subservience to Sarawak administration, a scheme imposed on Brunei under a Sarawak-Brunei 
administrative union which saw Brunei’s administration run largely by the seconded officers from the 
Sarawak including the Residentsince 1948.83The more the Colonial Office promoted the concept of 
‘closer association’, the greater the popular support enjoyed by the PRB among his ranks and file. As an 
ideological replacement for British colonial rule, support for Kalimantan Utara was drawing together an 
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incipient ‘Borneo’ nationalism. In fact, until late 1957 the Colonial Office had restrained open pursuit of 
the Borneo-Federation idea, since the PRB had already proposed it in their manifesto of 1956.And when 
Tunku Abdul Rahman finally announced his Malaysia plan in May 1961 to include all the said States, all 
hell broke loose for the PRB that finally resulted in an enforced or forced rebellion. This is the main 
thrust of this paper.  
 
 As mentioned earlier, Azahari himself followed leftist policies favoured by his Socialist-minded Malayan 
colleagues and mentors. Thus in order to entrench his party’s position he began to open new channels of 
communication with people, countries and organisations which were all aligned to anti-capitalist 
ideologies. During 1961-62, Azahari’s several trips abroad including Indonesia, Kuching and Singapore 
brought him into close contact with the Partindo, SUPP, and the Barisan Sosialis respectively. Each of 
these parties had been accused of alleged links with Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), Malayan Communist 
Party (MCP), and the Sarawak’s Communist Clandestine Organisation (CCO). Thus purposefully or  
inadvertently Azahari’s politics was sucked into the vortex of Cold War politics when he aligned himself 
with forces supposed to be Communist oriented through an  ideological commitment to Soviet Russia 
and Mao Zhe Dung’s China. Although Azahari was not a Communist at heart to say the least, he easily 
became a target of his distractors, especially the oil interests in Brunei who tried to portray him as a 
Communist sympathiser bent on nationalizing State Assets as the Communists had achieved in Russia, 
China, Cuba and so on. 
 
It was Azahari’s increasing rapprochement with Indonesia that alarmed the British authorities.84Azahari 
counted on the Indonesian support for money and training of the troops, and moral support from the 
Philippines. Since 1959 he began visiting Indonesia and made contacts with some of his former 
revolutionary colleagues who empathised with his cause to sniff out British colonialism in the region.85 
Several PRB senior members had been ostensibly attending meetings and conferences in Indonesia. 
According to a British report a senior PRB leader went to Jakarta in mid-August 1961 to enlist support 
and Azahari and nearly all his party members of importance were also in Jakarta in October.86 On 23 
February 1962, a party delegation attended the congress of Partindo, an Indonesian party dominated by 
the Partai Komunis Indonesia.87 
 
In Brunei, after undue delay allegedly in finalising the electoral list under a new Nationality 
Enactment of 1st January 1961, the much awaited elections took place in August 1962. Using the 
opposition to Malaysia issue as its main election manifesto88, the PRB achieved a massive electoral win 
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grabbing 22 out of 23 seats.89 It was a sweet revenge for the party over the British and the ‘monarch-
aristocrats’ group, who the PRB accused of delaying the elections to find ways to reduce the public poll 
on PRB and its opposition to Malaysia. The victory proved the undisputed popularity of the PRB and 
established its right to represent the people of Brunei in the eyes of the law.90 
The PRB victory signalled profound implications for the future of Brunei in general and the Malaysia 
proposal in particular. During its Fifth Annual General Assembly held in January 1961, the PRB had 
announced that it would call for independence in 1963 if it was returned with a large majority, and it also 
demanded a cabinet form of Government.91 All the minor parties that supported Brunei’s joining 
Malaysia had been badly routed in the elections. The Malaysia issue divided societies not just in Brunei 
but also in Singapore under the newly formed Sosialis Front, a break away party from Lee Kuan Yew’s 
PAP in June 1961, the Malaya Socialist Front and the SUPP in Sarawak with which the PRB came to join 
hands on a common front to defeat not only the formation of Malaysia but also through it the 
perpetuation of British colonial interests.While the Brunei Sultan was sitting on the fence, neither 
supporting the pro-Malaysia parties nor its opponents, the PRB devised its own strategies to rise up to 
gain power. Thus referring to the anti- Malaysia fever an editorial in the Borneo Bulletincommented on 
‘the danger...that, for the first time in Brunei’s history, there may be an open rift between the 
administration headed by His Highness and the people. The signs are apparent [that], feeling is now 
running high on this issue and that the Brunei Government must tread carefully--and democratically’.92 
The brief history of the LegCo under PRB domination can be studied from the point of view of almost 
entirely on the tensions brought up by the Malaysia issue. The Sultan during his 46th birthday honours 
speech to the Council on 23 September informed that he was accepting the merger in principle.93The 
PRB members in the LegCo kept on the pressure to adopt several anti-Malaysia motions while 
demanding a proposed Federation of North Borneo States and asked Britain to grant complete 
independence to Brunei by August 1963. The LegCo sessions was postponed three times on various 
pretexts by the Government to thwart PRB’s anti-Malaysia proposals. Rumours were in the air that a 
Government-nominated member might vote in favour of the PRB motions, giving it the necessary 
majority.94 Besides, the Government was pressurised to grant instant democracy. In September 1962, 
Azahari wanted the Sultan to form a Cabinet (with the PRB members) in recognition of the 55 popularly-
elected District Councillors.95 Similarly a senior leader of the PRB also called for the scrapping of the 1959 
Constitution to be replaced by a new one based on the principles of democratic Government.96 
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The PRB members submitted three motions to be tabled at the LegCo meeting to be taken up at 
themeeting scheduled to be held on 5 December 1962. The three motions dealt with: 
1. Rejecting Malaysia. 
2. Requesting restoration of Brunei sovereignty over Sarawak and North Borneo and the installation 
of the Sultan as Constitutional monarch of the North Borneo Federation. 
 
3. Requesting the British Government to grant independence not later than 1963. 
The Speaker disallowed the motions because the Brunei LegCo lacked authority to discuss issues that fell 
within the purview of the British Government under the 1959 Brunei-UK Agreement. The LegCo sessions 
were postponed again, first to the 13th and again to the 19th. Apparently there was no statutory 
requirement the 1959 Constitution to summon the new LegCo after a general election.97Only the 
Government could summon the LegCo after elections. Besides the need to study the implications of the 
motions, the Government was required to provide answers to more than one hundred questions raised 
by the PRB members elected to the Council.98 The PRB dominated LEGCO never met. 
 ‘Time and tide waits for no man’ they say, and the events that followed overtook every one’s 
calculations when burst into a conflagration, the outcome of which no one could predict 
immediately.Thusthe flame of the rebellion was lit on the early hours on 8 December, the upshot of 
which wiped out the much-touted democratic advancement in Brunei. It also nailed the coffin on 
Azahari’s grandiose ambition to form a Northern Kalimantan State with him as its first Prime Minister 
and the Brunei Sultan as the supreme constitutional monarch.Instead of continuing with the democratic 
experiment, Brunei was flung back to become a neo-traditional Malay monarchy. More important, in the 
immediate aftermath of the rebellion, the Government imposed emergency rule which is still in force. 
Britain conveniently gve up her responsibilities in making Brunei a truly democratic State ala west, and 
granted full independence on 1 January 1984 without any safeguards for a representative Government. 
As Stockwell concluded, the rebellion,if at all, was one of the factors that assisted the royal ascendancy 
in Brunei that was set in motion during the reign of Sultan Haji Omar Ali Saifuddin III. 
 
Unable to return to Brunei after the failed rebellion, Azahari and some of his associates set up a 
Government in exile with the support of Malaysia and Indonesia. Malaysia continued to espouse his 
cause in the United Nations to the chagrin of the Brunei Government until about 1975. But Azahari’s luck 
ran out when the Konfrontasi era between Indonesia and Malaysia came to an end when the diplomatic 
tensions eased between them while the ASEAN was born to forge common links among the Southeast 
Asian nations. A much disappointed man, Azahari, despite his yearning to return to Brunei like his other 
rebel compatriots did, passed away as an exile in Bogor, Indonesia in 2002. Nor did his compatriots such 
as Lim Chin Siong, Syed Zahari and others in Singapore prosperfollowing the debacle of the rebellion. 
They went to prison under Premier Lee Kuan Yew’s purge and were released after many years of 
detention and died without ever realising their dream of a Socialist State.  
Concluding Remarks:   
No armed insurrection could have succeeded given the utter incompetency of the rebels who over 
estimated their strength and underestimated the might of their adversaries -- the British Empire, the 
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protecting power of both Brunei and its Sultan. At the start of the rebellion the TNKU arsenal consisted 
of no more than a couple of hundred shot guns, some pistols in the possession of leaders, parangs, axes, 
spears, and bamboo sticks. A number of rebels wore ‘magical’ amulets in the belief this would  protect 
them from enemy bullets!99 But at the sight of blood or a colleague killed they were ready to surrender 
or flee into the jungle.  
In stating the rebellion prematurely the leader Azahari may have played into the hands of the extreme 
elements in his party,as often claimed.  As a leader of the party, he has to take a greater share of blame 
for the final outcome, but local historiography is too quick, if not harsh in condemning him and even 
accusing of him as a ‘Communist’.100In the wake of global political crisis of the Cold War, Azahari with his 
socialist leaning political beliefs stood little chance of being accepted as pliant leader who would 
perpetuate British interests in the region. Initially it was in the best interests of the British to keep 
Azahari at bay andcreate a riftbetween him and the Sultan.Moreover, the economic interests of Brunei 
Oil Industry too often played out the Communist bogey to suppress Azahari’s rise to power. A true 
Bornean nationalist at heart, he did not wish to gain independence on a platter through the 
Britishlargess under the ‘Grand Design’ of the Malaysia Federation. Tunku Abdul Rahman’s 
announcementin May 1961 played mayhem among the regional politicians who loathed the 
continuation of the Britishcapitalist and colonial interests. As is well known, the Malaysia proposals 
exacerbated the emergence of new political movement in Singapore under Barisan Sosialis of Lim Chin 
Siong, and SUPP in Sarawak, all accused of strong Communist links,  with whom Azahari was ready to 
cooperate to achieve his political goals of independence from the British domination and socialist 
emancipation. However, Azahari never intended to establish a Communist client State in Brunei but in 
desperation he often threatened to become one if pushed to the corner. During the rebellion, his 
fighters erroneously believed that arms and armed support would flow from countries which occupied 
the opposite spectrum to the American-British axis in the Cold War. The rebels’ hope for overseas 
military assistance not only from Indonesia but also from the Communist States of China, Cuba and 
Vietnam, was but a symptom of Cold war camaraderie.101The only consolation they got perhaps was 
from the soothing words of comrade Nikita Khrushchev, in a speech to the Supreme Soviet Assembly 
mentioned Brunei along with Hong Kong and Macau as waiting to overthrow Capitalist imperialism!102as 
being a just struggle and so on. From his Manila hotel, at the height of the rebellion Azahari boasted to 
send 100,000 Indonesian volunteers to fight alongside the rebels.103 
If gaining constitutional power through the LegCo system why then Azahari did agree to form an armed 
wing --the Northern Kalimantan Army (TNKU)as some people ask. In fact it wasintended as a corollary to 
the political branch of the party, a common strategy of liberation struggle everywhere at the time. 
Azahari had been quick to admitthat the formation of the TNKU was not just about starting a rebellion. 
For him, the underground army served the need as a nursing ground for an independent army network 
to defend Brunei’s sovereignty in the event of the departure of the colonial government. Furthermore, 
Azahari’s liberation ideology of redistributing the income from the State oil resources instantly held an 
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appeal to Bruneians who felt many grievances against more than half a century of British Residency rule 
that had failed to bring much progress to the State. 
One final issue that needs to be commented as pertinent to this study is whether the Brunei Sultan Haji 
Omar Ali Saifuddin ever intended to join hands with Azahari in expelling the British from Brunei and 
become a Seri Mahkota (Supreme Ruler)of the NKKU? In other words, was he a ‘rebel’ like others among 
Azahari’s following.? Such implausible suggestions had been put forward by Azahari himself both before 
and after the rebellion took place and outside observers. The British versions contended that, the Sultan 
must have hedged his bets,104 an impression repeated in the writings of some historians. Starner, for 
example, writes that ‘it has been suggested in some quarters that there was perhaps a tacit agreement 
between Azahari and the Sultan, which the latter found it unwise subsequently to acknowledge’.105 Even 
the British High Commissioner at the time D. C. White’s report implicated the Sultan’s name in the 
rebellion.106 
Yet, when the rebellion broke out, Sultan instantly condemned the actions of the rebels in his radio 
speech on the 8th and 15th of December 1962 and branded them as traitors which turned the tide of the 
course of the rebellion as the fighters had lost the will to continue their struggle. It appears that they 
were led to believe all the while that the Sultan was on their side. As Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, a former 
ideologue of the PRB said that ‘… Information gathered from the prisoners showed that the revolt was 
supposedly launched with the blessing of the Sultan. Its objective was to establish a government with the 
Sultan as its head. Such propaganda could easily influence the traditional people who were too fanatical 
towards the Sultan…’.107 On Sultan’s part, he walked a tight rope. He could not express his real inner 
opinion if he would join the Malaysia Federation or not as he was placed between ‘the fire and the frying 
pan’.108 If he said that he did not like the plan, he would have thrown himself in the Azahari’s camp that 
would make both Britain and Malayan leaders to unilaterally shove the hapless Sultan to accept the 
merger. If he declared that he was for Malaysia, then the PRB would have bulldozed its way in the Brunei 
LegCo and sought support from its Socialist Allies and even international bodies like the U.N.for 
recognition to defeat the Malaysia proposal. One of the staunchest rebels, Jassin Affandi had said in an 
interview that the NKKU would not have resorted to armed rebellion if only the Sultan had made his 
intentions clear about his dislike of Malaysia plan at the time. Perhaps there is much truth in this.109 
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To conclude, it was partly Azahari’s inflexible attitude and over-confidence in his cause of establishing a 
people’s government in Brunei, albeit under a Constitutional monarchy that led to the final debacle of 
defeat of the rebellion regardless of arguments who started it and when it should have been started and 
so on.  It was both Azahari as well as his followers who became losers in a political game that was played 
not just within the borders of Brunei but caught up inadvertently in the Cold war politics which also 
claimed many other victims in the region who opposed the formation of Malaysia. All in all Azahari and 
his socialist colleagues in Singapore and Malaya failed to gain power to realise their dreams of 
establishing libertarian governments away from neo-colonialism.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
